Curriculum Vitae
University of Miami · Department of Philosophy
1252 Memorial Drive, Ashe 721 · Coral Gables, FL 33124-4670
(305) 284-4757 · e.chudnoff@miami.edu
1252 Memorial Drive, Ashe 721 · Coral Gables, FL 33124-4670
(305) 284-4757 · e.chudnoff@miami.edu
Areas
Specialization
Theory of Knowledge, Philosophy of Mind
Employment
2020 – present
Professor of Philosophy
University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL
University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL
2014 – 2020
Associate Professor of Philosophy
University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL
University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL
2008 – 2014
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL
University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL
Education
2001 – 2008
Ph.D. in Philosophy
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
1997 – 2001
B.A. in Philosophy
University of Florida, Gainesville, FL
University of Florida, Gainesville, FL
Publications
Books
Inferential Processes (with Anna-Sara Malmgren). Under contract, Cambridge University Press.
Forming Impressions: Expertise in Perception and Intuition. 2020. Oxford University Press.
Cognitive Phenomenology. 2015. Routledge.
Intuition. 2013. Oxford University Press.
Journal Articles
Inference, Logical Omniscience, and Fortunate Fallacies. Forthcoming. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
What Mathematical Understanding Need Not Be (with Silvia De Toffoli). 2025. Journal of Mathematical Behavior.
The Nature and Value of Firsthand Insight. 2024. Philosophical Studies.
Skepticism Is Wrong for General Reasons. 2023. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13(2): 95–104.
Two Kinds of Cognitive Expertise. 2021. Noûs 55(2): 270–292.
In Search of Intuition. 2020. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98(3): 465–480.
The Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Learning. 2018. Inquiry 61(5–6): 520–542.
How Perception Generates, Preserves, and Mediates Justification (with Bartek Chomanski). 2018. Inquiry 61(5–6): 559–568.
Epistemic Elitism and Other Minds. 2018. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96(2): 276–298.
The Reality of the Intuitive. 2017. Inquiry 60(4): 371–385.
Against Emotional Dogmatism (with Berit Brogaard). 2016. Philosophical Issues 26(1): 59–77.
Intuition, Presentational Phenomenology, and Awareness of Abstract Objects. 2016. Florida Philosophical Review 16(1): 117–128.
Phenomenal Contrast Arguments for Cognitive Phenomenology. 2015. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90(2): 82–104.
The Epistemic Unity of Perception (with David DiDomenico). 2015. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96(4): 535–549.
Awareness of Abstract Objects. 2013. Noûs 47(4): 706–726.
Gurwitsch's Phenomenal Holism. 2013. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12(3): 559–578.
Is Intuition Based On Understanding? 2013. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86(1): 42–67.
Intuitive Knowledge. 2013. Philosophical Studies 162(2): 359–378.
What Intuitions Are Like. 2011. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82(3): 625–654.
The Nature of Intuitive Justification. 2011. Philosophical Studies 153(2): 313–333.
What Should a Theory of Knowledge Do? 2011. Dialectica 65(4): 561–579.
Book Chapters
Reasoned Change in Logic. 2026. In K. McCain & S. Stapleford (eds.), Evidentialism at 40: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.
Perceptually Secured Knowledge. 2025. In O. Beck & F. Masrour (eds.), The Relational View of Perception: New Philosophical Essays. Routledge.
Inferential Seemings. 2024. In U. Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Mind, Vol. 4. Oxford University Press.
How to Use Thought Experiments. 2024. In B. Roeber, E. Sosa, M. Steup & J. Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd ed. Wiley-Blackwell.
How to Think About How to Use Thought Experiments. 2024. In B. Roeber, E. Sosa, M. Steup & J. Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd ed. Wiley-Blackwell.
Veridical Perceptual Seemings. 2023. In K. McCain & S. Stapleford (eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.
Consciousness and Knowledge (with Berit Brogaard). 2020. In U. Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Intuition in the Gettier Problem. 2019. In S. Heatherington (ed.), Classic Philosophical Arguments: The Gettier Problem. Cambridge University Press.
Experience and Epistemic Structure: Can Cognitive Penetration Result in Epistemic Downgrade? 2019. In T. Chan & A. Nes (eds.), Inference and Consciousness. Routledge.
Multisensory Consciousness and Synesthesia (with Berit Brogaard). 2018. In R. J. Gennaro (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. Routledge.
Moral Perception: High Level Perception or Low Level Intuition? 2015. In D. Breyer & C. Gutland (eds.), Phenomenology of Thinking. Routledge.
The Rational Roles of Intuition. 2014. In A. Booth & D. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press.
Intuition in Mathematics. 2014. In L. Held & B. Osbeck (eds.), Rational Intuition. Cambridge University Press.
Intellectual Gestalts. 2013. In U. Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
Presentational Phenomenology. 2012. In S. Miguens & G. Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag.
Book Reviews
Review of Philosophical Methodology: From Data to Theory, by J. Bengson, T. Cuneo & R. Shafer-Landau. 2025. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 103(2): 560–562.
Review of The Epistemic Role of Consciousness, by D. Smithies. 2021. The Philosophical Review 130(4): 605–609.
Review of The Centered Mind, by P. Carruthers. 2016. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
Review of On Reflection, by H. Kornblith. 2015. Mind 124(496): 1319–1322.
Review of Seemings and Justification, ed. Tucker. 2014. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
Review of What Place for the A Priori?, ed. Shaffer & Veber. 2011. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
Review of Mathematical Knowledge, ed. Leng, Paseau & Potter. 2009. Mind 118(471): 846–850.